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Recent advances in Cognitive Science and Cognitive Neuroscience 
open up new vistas for human enhancement. Central to much of this 
work is the idea of new Human-Machine interfaces (in general) and 
new Brain-Machine interfaces (in particular). But despite the 
increasing prominence of such ideas, the very idea of such an 
interface remains surprisingly under-explored. In particular, the notion 
of human enhancement suggests an image of the embodied and 
reasoning agent as literally extended or augmented, rather than the 
more conservative image of a standard (non-enhanced) agent using 
a tool via some new interface. In this essay, I explore this difference, 
and attempt to lay out some of the conditions under which the more 
radical reading (positing brand new integrated agents or systemic 
wholes) becomes justified.  
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Introduction: Where the Rubber Meets the Road. 
 
In a short article in the May 2004 edition of WIRED magazine 
(revealingly subititled ‘Fear and Loathing on the Human-Machine 
Frontier’) the futurist and science fiction writer Bruce Sterling sounds 
an increasingly familiar alarm. After warning us of the imminent 
dangers of “brain augmentation” he adds: 
 
“Another troubling frontier is physical, as opposed to mental, 
augmentation. Japan has a rapidly growing elderly population 
and a serious shortage of caretakers. So Japanese 
roboticists…envision walking wheelchairs and mobile arms that 
manipulate and fetch. But there’s ethical hell at the interfaces. 
The peripherals may be dizzyingly clever gizmos…but the CPU 
is a human being: old, weak, vulnerable, pitifully limited, 
possibly senile” (Sterling, 2004 p.116). 
 
This kind of fear is rooted, I shall argue, in a fundamentally 
misconceived vision of our own humanity: a vision that depicts us as 
‘locked-in agents’: as beings whose minds and physical abilities are 
fixed quantities, apt (at best) for mere support and scaffolding by their 
best technologies. In contrast to this view I have argued (Clark 1997, 
2003) that human minds and bodies are essentially open to episodes 
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of deep and transformative re-structuring, in which new equipment 
(both physical and ‘mental’) can become quite literally incorporated 
into the thinking and acting systems that we identify as minds and 
persons. In what follows, I pursue this theme with special attention to 
the very notion of the human-machine interface itself. 
 
It helps to start with the commonplace. Sensing and moving are the 
spots where the rubber of embodied agency meets the road of the 
wider world, the world outside the agent’s physical boundaries. The 
typical human agent, circa 2004, feels herself to be a bounded 
physical entity in contact with the world via a variety of standard 
sensory channels, including touch, vision, smell and hearing. It is a 
commonplace observation, however, that the use of simple tools can 
lead to alterations in that local sense of embodiment. Picking up and 
using a stick, we feel as if we are touching the world at the end of the 
stick, not (usually) as if we are touching the stick with our hand. The 
stick, it has sometimes been suggested, is in some way incorporated 
and the overall effect seems more like bringing a temporary whole 
new agent-world circuit into being, rather than simply exploiting the 
stick as a helpful prop or tool.  
 
In these cases there suddenly seem to be two interfaces at play: the 
place where the stick meets the hand, and the place where the 
extended system “biological-agent+stick” meets the rest of the world. 
When we read about new forms of human-machine interface, we are 
again confronted by a similar duality, and an accompanying tension. 
What makes such interfaces appropriate as mechanisms for human 
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enhancement is, it seems, precisely their potential role in creating 
whole new agent-world circuits. But insofar as they succeed at this 
task, the new agent-tool interface itself fades from view, and the 
proper picture is one of an extended or enhanced agent confronting 
the (wider) world. 
 
In sections 1 and 2 I shall lightly explore this notion of the interface, 
and then look at some examples in which new systemic wholes are 
created by various forms of technological intervention. Section 3 asks 
under what conditions it becomes proper to speak of enhanced 
agents rather than un-enhanced agents with new props and 
scaffoldings. Here, I try to show that there is more at issue  than a 
way of speaking, and that there are scientifically and philosophically 
important differences between the two cases. Next (section 4) I 
extend the discussion from bodily augmentation to mental 
augmentation, indicating what would need to be done to make the 
vexed idea of enhanced human mentality concrete. The discussion 
continues (section 5) by developing a notion of the ‘profoundly 
embodied agent’ as a means of marking the philosophical and 
scientific importance of our potential for repeated and literal episodes 
of self re-configuration. The paper ends by relating this image of 
profound embodiment to some questions (and fears) concerning 
converging technologies for improving human performance. 
 
 
1. What’s in an Interface? 
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Haugeland (1998) is, in part, an extended philosophical meditation on 
the very idea of an interface. The goal is to uncover the underlying 
principles “for dividing systems into distinct subsystems along 
nonarbitrary lines” (op cit, p.211). According to Haugeland, the 
notions of ‘component’ ‘system’ and ‘interface’ are all interdefined and 
interdefining. Components are those parts of a larger whole that 
interact through interfaces. Systems are “relatively independent and 
self-contained” composites of such interfaced components. And an 
interface itself is: “ a point of interactive “contact” between 
components such that the relevant interactions are well-defined, 
reliable and relatively simple” (Haugeland 1998 p 213). 
 
 
Haugeland is right, I think, to point to the nature of interactions as the 
key to the location of an interface. We discern an interface where we 
discern a kind of regimented, often deliberately designed, point of 
contact between two or more independently tuneable or replaceable 
parts. It does not seem correct, however, to insist that flow across the 
interface be simple. The idea here seems to be that we find genuine 
interfaces only where we find energetic or informational bottlenecks, 
as if an interface must be a narrow channel yielding what Haugeland 
describes as ‘low bandwidth’ coupling. This is important for 
Haugeland’s argumentative purpose, as he means to show (by 
appeal to broadly-speaking Gibsonian characterizations of sensing: 
see Gibson (1979))  that human sensing typically yields very task-
variable, high-bandwidth forms of agent-environment coupling, and 
thus to argue that no genuine interface or interfaces  separate agent 
 6 
and world. Instead, there is said to be “intimate intermingling of mind, 
body and world” (op cit 224).  
 
The Gibsonian angle is useful, as it points to two distinct ways in 
which we might conceive of our own biological sensory systems. 
According to the standard (non-Gibsonian) conception, a sensory 
interface is a point of information transduction. It is a point at which 
rich energetic input (e.g. visual input) must begin to be somehow 
transformed into discrete internal action-guiding representations. This 
is the notion of the sensory interface as a kind of fixed veil between 
an agent and a represented world. But there is another way to look at 
(at least some uses of) sensing, which can be introduced by a simple 
example. Consider running to catch a fly ball in baseball. Giving 
perception it's standard role, we might assume that the job of the 
visual system is to transduce information about the current position of 
the ball so as to allow a reasoning system to project its future 
trajectory. It seems, however, that nature has a more elegant and 
efficient solution: you simply run so that the ball's trajectory looks 
straight against the visual background (McBeath et al (1995). This 
solution exploits a powerful invariant in the optic flow, discussed in 
Lee and Reddish (1981). But most importantly for our purposes, it 
highlights (see Maturana (1980)) a very different role for the 
perceptual coupling itself. Instead of using sensing to get enough 
information inside, past the visual bottleneck, so as to allow the 
reasoning system to 'throw away the world' and solve the problem 
wholly internally, it uses the sensor as an open conduit allowing 
environmental magnitudes to exert a constant influence on behavior. 
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Sensing is here depicted as the opening of a channel, with successful 
whole-system behavior emerging when activity in this channel is kept 
within a certain range. What is created is thus a kind of new, task-
specific agent-world circuit.i As Randall Beer recently puts it: 
 
“the focus shifts from accurately representing an environment to 
continuously engaging that environment with a body so as to 
stabilize patterns of co-ordinated behavior that are adaptive for 
the agent” Beer (2000) p.97  
 
This shift in perspective on what sensing is (often) all about will be 
important later when we consider new sensory channels and their 
potential impact on the bounds of human agents. 
 
But whilst agreeing with Haugeland that sensing is often best 
understood in these terms, his own conclusion that no genuine 
interfaces then link agent and world seems premature. Haugeland 
depicts these kinds of ‘open-channel’ solution as involving “tightly 
coupled high-bandwidth interaction” (op cit p.223) and hence as 
inimical to the very idea of an agent-world interfaceii. But it seems 
intuitive that there can be genuine  interfaces that support extremely 
high-bandwidth forms of coupling. Think, for example, of multiple 
computers linked into a network by means of super-fast, very high 
bandwidth ‘grid technologies’iii. There is really no doubt but that we 
here confront a web of distinct intercommunicating component 
machines. Yet that web, in action, can sometimes function as a single 
unified resource. Nonetheless we still think of it as a web of distinct-
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but-interfaced devices. And we do so not because the point of each 
machines contact with the grid is narrow (it isn’t) but because there 
exist, for each machine on the grid, very well-defined points of 
potential detachment and re-engagement. We discern interfaces at 
the points at which one machine can be easily disengaged and 
another engaged instead, allowing the first to join another grid, or to 
operate in a stand-alone fashion. An interface, I conclude, is indeed a 
point of contact between two items across which the types of 
performance-relevant interaction are reliable and well-defined. But 
there is no requirement that such interfaces be narrow-bandwidth 
bottlenecks.  
 
2. New Systemic Wholes 
 
Biological systems, from lampreys to primates, display remarkable 
powers of bodily and sensory adaptabilityiv. The Australian 
performance artist Stelarc routinely deploys a ‘third hand’, a 
mechanical actuator controlled by Stelarc’s brain via commands to 
muscle sites on his legs and abdomenv. Activity at these sites is 
monitored by electrodes that transmit signals (via a computer) to the 
artificial hand. Stelarc reports that, after some years of practice and 
performance, he now feels as if he simply wills the third hand to 
move. It has become what some philosophers call ‘transparent 
equipment’: something through which Stelarc (the agent) can act on 
the world without first willing an action on anything else. In this 
respect, it now functions much as his biological hands and arms, 
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serving his goals without (generally) being itself an object of 
conscious thought or effortful control.  
 
Recent experimental work reveals more about the kinds of 
mechanisms that may be at work in such cases. A much-publicized 
example is the work by Miguel Nicolelis and colleagues on a BMI 
(Brain-Machine Interface) that allows a macaque monkey to use 
thought control to move a robot arm. In the most recent version of this 
work, Carmena et al (2003) implanted 320 electrodes in the frontal 
and parietal lobes of a monkey. The electrodes allowed a monitoring 
computer to record neural activity across multiple cortical ensembles 
while the monkey learnt to use a joystick to move a cursor across a 
computer screen for rewards. As in previous work, the computer was 
able to extract the neural activity patterns corresponding to different 
movements (including direction and grip). Next, the joystick is 
disconnected. But the monkey is still able to use its neural activity to 
directly control the cursor for rewards, and learns to do so. Finally 
(and this is the new element in the work) these commands are 
diverted to a robot arm whose actual motions are then translated into 
on screen cursor movements (including an on-screen equivalent of 
forceful gripping). This closes the loop. Instead of the monkey merely 
moving an unseen robot arm by thought control alone, the 
movements now yield visual feedback in the form of on-screen cursor 
motion. 
 
When the robot arm was inserted into the control loop, the monkey 
displayed a striking degradation of behavior. It took two full days of 
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practice for fluent thought-control over the onscreen cursor to be re-
established. The reason was that the monkey’s brain now had to 
learn to factor in the mechanical and temporal ‘friction’ created by the 
new physical equipment: it had to factor in the mechanical and 
dynamical properties of the robot arm and the time delays (which 
were substantial, in the 60-90 millisecond range) caused by 
interposing the motion of the arm between neural command and on-
screen feedback. By the time full fluency was achieved, it is 
reasonable to conjecture that these properties of the (still unseen) 
distant arm were incorporated into the monkey’s own body-schema. 
In support of this, the experimenters were able to track real long-term 
physiological changes in the response profiles of fronto-parietal 
neurons following use of the BMI, leading them to comment that: 
 
“the dynamics of the robot arm (reflected by the cursor 
movements) become incorporated into multiple cortical 
representations…we propose that the gradual increase in 
behavioral performance…emerged as a consequence of a 
plastic re-organization whose main outcome was the 
assimilation of the dynamics of an artificial actuator into the 
physiological properties of fronto-parietal neurons” 
 
Carmena et al (2003)  p.205 
 
Creatures capable of this kind of deep incorporation of new bodily 
(and, as we’ll see, sensory and cognitive) structure are examples of 
what I shall call (see section 4) ‘profoundly embodied agents”. Such 
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agents are able constantly to negotiate and re-negotiate the agent-
world boundary itself.  
 
Although our own capacity for such re-negotiation is (I believe) vastly 
under-appreciated, it really should come as no great surprise, given 
the facts of biological bodily growth and change. The human infant 
must learn by ‘self-exploration’ which neural commands bring about 
which bodily effects, and must then practice until skilled enough to 
issue those commands without conscious effort. This process has 
been dubbed (Meltzoff and Moore (1997)) “body babbling” and 
continues until the infant body becomes “transparent equipment”. 
Since bodily growth and change continues, it is simply good design 
not to permanently lock in knowledge of any particular configuration, 
but instead to deploy plastic neural resources and an ongoing regime 
of monitoring and re-calibration (for some excellent discussion, see 
Ramachandran and Blakeslee (1998)) 
 
As a second class of examples of re-calibration and re-negotiation, 
consider the plasticity revealed by work in Sensory Substitution. 
Pioneered in the 60’s and 70’s by Paul Bach-y-Rita and colleagues, 
the earliest such systems were grids of blunt ‘nails’ fitted to the backs 
of blind subjects, and taking input from a head-mounted camera. In 
response to the camera input, specific regions of the grid became 
active, gently stimulating the skin under the grid.At first, subjects 
report only a vague tingling sensation. But after wearing the grid while 
engaged in various kinds of goal-driven activity (walking, eating, etc) 
the reports change dramatically. Subjects stop feeling the tickling on 
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the back and start to report rough, quasi-visual experiences of 
looming objects etc. After a while, a ball thrown at the head causes 
instinctive and appropriate ducking. The causal chain is ‘deviant’: it 
runs via the systematic input to the back. But the nature of the 
information carried, and the way it supports the control of action, is 
suggestive of the visual modality. Performance using such devices 
can be quite impressive. In a recent review article, Bach-y-Rita and 
Kercel (2001, p.543) note that TVSS [Tactile Visual Substitution 
Systems] have enabled blind subjects to bat a ball as it rolled off a 
table edge, as well as perform a variety of complex co-ordination 
tasks 
 
The key to effective sensory substitution is goal-driven motor 
engagement. It seems to be crucial that the head-mounted camera 
be under the subject’s motor control. This meant that the brain could, 
in effect experiment via the motor system, giving commands that 
systematically varied the input, so as to begin to form hypotheses 
about what information the tactile signals might be carrying. Such 
training yields quite a flexible new agent-world circuit. Once trained in 
the use of the head-mounted camera the motor system operating the 
camera could be changed, eg to a hand-held camera, with no loss of 
acuity.  The touch pad, too, could be moved to new bodily sites, and 
there was no tactile/visual confusion: an itch scratched under the grid 
caused no ‘visual’ effects (for these results, again see Bach-y-Rita 
and Kercel (2003)).  
 
Such technologies, though still experimental, are now increasingly 
 13 
advanced. The back-mounted grid is often replaced by a tongue-
mounted coin sized array, and extensions in other sensory 
modalities. Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (op cit) give the nice example of a 
touch-sensor-rich glove that allows leprosy patients to begin to feel 
again using their hands. The patient is fitted with the glove that 
transmits signals to a forehead mounted tactile disc-array, and rapidly 
reports feeling sensations of touch at the fingertips . This is 
presumably because the motor-control over the sensors runs via 
commands to the hand, so the sensation is subsequently projected to 
that site. 
 
The line between these kinds of rehabilitative strategy and wholly 
new forms of bodily and sensory enhancement is already thin to the 
point of non-existence. There is advanced work on night-vision 
versions of sensory substitution, and (at the more dramatic end of this 
spectrum) it is possible bypass the existing sensory peripheries, 
feeding signals direct to cortex (see Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2001) 
and discussion in Clark (2003)).  Even without penetrating the 
existing surface of skin and skull, sensory enhancement and bodily 
extension is a pervasive possibility. One rather unusual example 
,reported in Schrope (2001), is a US Navy innovation known as a 
tactile flight suit. The suit (a kind of vest worn by the pilot) allows even 
inexperienced helicopter pilots to perform difficult tasks such as 
holding the helicopter in a stationary hover in the air. It works by 
generating bodily sensations (via safe puffs of air) inside the suit. If 
the craft is tilting to the right or left or forward or backward, the pilot 
feels a puff-induced vibrating sensation on that side of the body. The 
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pilots’ own responses (moving in the opposite direction so as to 
correct the vibrations) can even be monitored by the suit to control 
the helicopter. The suit is so good at transmitting and delivering 
information in a natural and easy way that military pilots can use it to 
fly blindfold.  
 
How should we think of such cases? While wearing the suit, the 
helicopter behaves very much like an extended body for the pilot: it 
rapidly links the pilot to the aircraft in the same kind of closed loop 
interaction that linked Stelarc and the third hand, or the monkey and 
the robot arm, or the blind person and the TVSS system. What 
matters, in each case, is the provision of closed-loop signaling so that 
motor commands affect sensory input. What varies is the amount of 
training (and hence the extent of deeper neural changes) required to 
fully exploit the new agent-world circuits thus created. It is crucial, in 
all these cases, that the new agent-world circuits be trained and 
calibrated in the context of a whole agent engaged in world-directed 
(goal-driven) activity.  One sign of successful calibration is, as we 
noted earlier, that once fluency is achieved the specific details of the 
(old or new) circuitry by which the world is engaged fall ‘transparent’ 
in use. The conscious agent is then aware of the oncoming ball, not 
of seeing the ball, or (by the same token) of using a tactile 
substitution channel to detect the ball. In just this way the tactile-vest 
wearing pilot becomes aware of the plane’s tilt and slant, not of the 
puffs of air. Perception, as Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991) and 
O’ Regan and Noe (2001) have persuasively argued, just is this 
open-ended process of actively engaging a world.  
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To sum up, humans and other primates are integrated but constantly 
negotiable bodily platforms of sensing, moving and (as we’ll soon 
see) reasoning. Such platforms extend an open invitation to 
technologies of human enhancement: they are biologically designed 
so as to fluidly incorporate new bodily and sensory kit, creating brand 
new systemic wholes 
 
3. Incorporation versus Use. 
 
A very natural doubt to raise, at about this point, would be the 
following:  
 
Critic: “You are making quite a song and a dance out of this, 
what with talk of brand new systemic wholes and so on. But we 
all know we can use tools, and that we can sometimes learn to 
use them fluently and ‘transparently’. Why talk of new systemic 
wholes, of extended bodies and reconfigured users, rather than 
just the same old user in command of a new tool?” 
 
This is the right question to push, and we have already seen a hint of 
the answer in the comments of Carmena at al concerning the altered 
response profile of certain fronto-parietal neurons. To bring the key 
idea into focus, it helps next to consider a closely related body of 




Recent years have seen the discovery, in primate brains, of a variety 
of so-called ‘bi-modal neurons’ These are: 
 
“Pre-motor, parietal and putaminal neurons that respond both to 
somatosensory information from a given body region (ie the 
somatosensory Receptive Field; sRF) and to visual information 
from the space (visual Receptive Field;vRF) adjacent to it” 
 
Maravita and Iriki (2004) p. 79 
 
For example, some neurons respond to somatosensory stimuli (light 
touches) at the hand and to visually presented stimuli near the hand, 
so as to yield an action-relevant coding of visual space. In a series of 
experiments, recordings were taken from bi-modal neurons in the 
intraparietal cortex of Japanese macaques while they (the macaques) 
learnt to reach for food using a rake. The experimenters found that 
after just 5 minutes of rake-use, the responses of some bi-modal 
neurons whose original vRFs picked out stimuli near the hand had    
expanded to include the entire length of the tool, “as if the rake was 
part of the arm and forearm” (op cit p. 79). Similarly, other bi-modal 
neurons, that previously responded to visual stimuli within the space 
reachable by the arm, now had vRFs that covered the space 
accessible by the arm-rake combination. After surveying a number of 
other related findings (including some fascinating work in which 
similar effects are observed after experience of reaching with a virtual 
arm in an on-screen display) Maravita and Iriki conclude that: 
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“Such vRF expansions may constitute the neural substrate of 
use-dependent assimilation of the tool into the body-schema, 
suggested by classical neurology” 
Maravita and Iriki (2004) p.80 
 
 
It is also noteworthy, especially in the light of our previous discussion, 
that: 
 
 “any expansion of the vRF only followed active, intentional use 
of the tool not its mere grasping by the hand” 
(op cit p. 81). 
 
In human subjects suffering from unilateral neglect (in which stimuli 
from within a certain region of egocentrically coded space are 
selectively ignored) it has been shown that the use of a stick as a tool 
for reaching actually extends the area of visual neglect to encompass 
the space now reachable using the tool (see Berti and Frassinetti  
(2000)). Berti and Frassinetti conclude that: 
 
“The brain makes a distinction between ‘far space’ (the space 
beyond reaching distance) and ‘near space’   (the space within 
reaching distance)” and that “…simply holding a stick causes a 
remapping of far space to near space. In effect the brain, at 
least for some purposes, treats the stick as though it were a 
part of the body” Berti and Frassinetti (2000) p. 415 
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The plastic neural changes reported by Carmena et al (section2 
above), and now further underlined by Maravita and Iriki, and by Berti 
and Frassinetti are, I want to suggest, the key to a real 
(philosophically important and scientifically solid) distinction between 
true incorporation into the body-schema and mere use. The body-
schema, in this sense, is not the same thing as the body-image, 
though the two can sometimes be related. As I shall use the terms 
,the body image is a conscious construct, able to inform thought and 
reasoning about the body. The body schema is a suite of neural 
settings that implicitly (and non-consciously) define a body in terms of 
its capabilities for action, for example, by defining the extent of ‘near 
space’ for action programsvi. I would speculate, however, that the 
striking conscious experiential datum of equipment (not just rakes but 
even cars and violins) falling transparent in use is plausibly one 
result, in conscious agents, of just these kinds of deeper changes: 
changes (that may be temporary, context-dependent, or longterm) in 
the body-schema itself.  
 
It is important to notice that we can certainly imagine tool-users 
(perhaps even fluent tool-users?) whose brains were not engineered 
so as to adapt the body-schema in these ways.  Such beings would 
always use tools the way we typically begin: by representing the tool 
and its features and powers (its length, for example) and calculating 
effective uses accordingly. We can even imagine (I think) beings who 
were so fast and good at these calculations as to deploy the tools 
with the same skill and efficacy as an expert human agent. The 
contrast that would remain, even in the latter kind of case, would be 
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between the skilled agent’s first representing the shape, dimensions 
and powers of the tool and then inferring (consciously or otherwise) 
that you can now reach such and such, and do such and such, and 
agents whose brains were so constituted that experience with the tool 
results in (for example) a suite of altered vRFs such that objects 
within tool-augmented reaching range are now automatically treated 
as falling within ‘near space’.  
 
These are surely distinct strategies. The latter strategy might be 
especially recommended for beings whose bodies (like our own) are 
naturally subject to growth and change. Beings deploying this 
strategy do not relate to their own bodies the way classical cognitive 
science depicts the intelligent agent as relating to its world, namely, 
via a process of objectivist representation and inference. The deep 
distinction is thus between various forms of knowledge-based use 
(which involves a lot of explicit representation of features, properties, 
and inferences based on those features), and genuine episodes of 
assimilation and integration, which can now be defined as cases in 
which plastic neural resources are re-calibrated (in the context of 
goal-directed whole agent activity) to reflect new bodily and sensory 
opportunities. In this way, our own embodied activity brings forth new 
systemic wholes. 
 
4. Extended Cognition 
 
Could anything like this notion of ‘incorporation’ (rather than mere 
use) and new systemic wholes get a grip in the more ethereal domain 
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of mind and cognition? Could human minds be genuinely extended 
and augmented by cultural and technological tweaks, or is it always 
(as many evolutionary psychologists, such as Pinker (1997) would 
have us believe) just the same old mind with a shiny new tool? Here, 
the story is murkier by far. My own view, defended at much greater 
length elsewhere (see Clark and Chalmers (1998), Clark (2003) (In 
Press)) is that external and non-biological information-processing 
resources are also apt for temporary or long-term recruitment and 
incorporation rather than simply knowledge-based use, and that to 
whatever extent that this holds, we are not just bodily and sensorily 
but also cognitively permeable agents. But whereas we can point, in 
the case of basic tool use, to visible neural changes that accompany 
the genuine assimilation of new bodily structure, it is harder to know 
what to look for in the case of mental and cognitive routines.  
 
It may be helpfulvii first to display the bare logical possibility of such 
cognitive extension. For even the bare possibility, some might feel, is 
ruled out by a simple argument to the effect that "cognitive 
enhancement requires that the cognitive operations of the prop be 
intelligible to the agent". If this were so, cognitive enhancement would 
always be in some clear sense superficial. But the argument is 
flawed, since the cognitive operations of much of my own brain are 
not thus intelligible to me, the conscious agent. Yet they surely help 
make me the cognitive agent I am. It also helps to reflect that 
biological brains must change and evolve by coordinating old 
activities and processes with new ones made available by new or 
subtly altered structures. To insist that such change requires the 
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literal intelligibility of the operations of the new by the old (rather than 
simply some appropriate integration and co-ordination) is to miss the 
potential for new wholes that are themselves the determiners of what 
is and is not intelligible. Certain non-biological tools and structures, I 
am thus suggesting, can become sufficiently well integrated into our 
problem-solving activity to count as parts of new wholes in just this 
way. But just what does such  integration (genuine cognitive 
incorporation) require? 
 
One suggestion (Clark and Chalmers (1998)) is that cognitive 
incorporation occurs when the existing system learns a complex 
problem-solving routine that makes deep implicit commitments to the 
robust availability of certain operations and/or bodies of information 
while carrying out some species of on-line problem solving. This is 
the cognitive equivalent, I would now suggest, of the implicit 
commitments to bodily shape and potentials for action made by 
tuning the receptive fields of bi-modal neurons. In the cognitive case, 
what matters is the delicate temporal tuning of multiple participating 
elements (including, for example, calls to internal or external 
information stores) that simply factor in the availability of those 
operations or bodies of information. 
 
The field of ‘active vision’ provides a nice example. Ballard et al 
(1997) studied a task in which subjects copied a pattern of colored 
blocks by moving them from one on-screen area (the model) to 
another (the target). Using eye-tracking techniques, the 
experimenters found that subjects looked to the model both before 
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and after picking up a block. The explanation for the apparently 
unnecessary repetitions of gaze seems to be that when glancing at 
the model, the subject stores only one piece of information:  either the 
color or the position of the next block to be copied (not both).The 
conclusion was that the brain uses repeated visual fixation to link a 
target location to a type of information (color or position) retrieving 
that information ‘just-in-time’ for use. In this way, according to the 
authors: 
 
“…fixation can be seen as binding the value of the variable 
currently relevant for the task [and] changing gaze is analogous 
to changing the memory reference in a silicon computer”.  
Ballard et al (1997) p. 723 
 
In this respect, for this task, the brain simply uses the external scene 
as its memory store.  
 
This subtle reliance on the external scene is dramatically illustrated 
by recent work on so-called ‘change blindness’ (see e.g. Simons 
(2000) in which simple experimental manipulations (the masking of 
motion transients while large changes are made to a visually 
presented scene) suggestviii the surprising sparseness of our on-the-
spot (all in one instant, or ‘snapshot’ –see Noe (2004)) conscious 
awareness. Subjects seldom these changes, and are often amazed 
when they realize what has happened without their noticing it.  One 
diagnosis of why we are not normally aware of any such sparseness 
is that our feeling of “seeing all the detail” in the scenes (and hence 
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the surprisingness of the demonstrations of unseen changes) is really 
a reflection of something implicit in the overall problem-solving 
organization in which vision participates. That organization ‘assumes’ 
the (ecologically normal) ability to retrieve more detailed info when 
needed, so we feel (correctly, in an important sense) that we are 
already in command of the detailix.  
 
The point, for present purposes, is that the brain need not actively 
represent the availability of such and such information from any given 
internal or external location. Instead, it simply deploys a problem-
solving routine (that may involve programmed saccades to a visual 
location, or calls to biological memory) whose fine temporal structure 
assumes the easy availability of such and such information from such 
and such a location. It is in this way (I am suggesting) that non-
biological informational resources can become - either temporarily or 
longterm – genuinely incorporated into the problem-solving whole. 
Just as the experienced brain need not (though it sometimes can) 
explicitly represent the shape of a tool and then infer the available 
reach, so too it need not (though it sometimes can) first represent the 
availability of specific information at some location, and then infer that 
it can find what it needs by accessing a given resource. Instead, a 
problem-solving routine is delicately ‘grown’ so as to maximally 
exploit the local informational fieldx. Such a field can include 
biological resources, environmental structure, and cognitive artifacts 
such as notebooks and laptops. As we move towards an era of 
wearable computing and ubiquitous information access, the robust, 
reliable information fields to which our brains delicately adapt their 
 24 
routines will become increasingly dense and powerful, further blurring 
the distinction between the cognitive agent and her best tools, props 
and artifacts. 
 
5. Profound Embodiment. 
 
The notion of embodimentxi plays an increasingly prominent role in 
Philosophy and Cognitive Science. It is not always clear, however, 
exactly what it is that matters about embodiment. I shall end, then, by 
making a concrete (but perhaps somewhat heretical) proposal, and 
then relating it to the questions concerning the nature of the interface 
and to the topic of converging technologies for improving human 
performance. 
 
We can distinguish three ‘grades’ of embodiment. I shall call these 
(rather unimaginatively) ‘mere embodiment’, ‘modest embodiment’ 
and ‘profound embodiment’. A ‘merely embodied’ creature or robot 
would be one equipped with a body and sensors, able to engage in 
closed-loop interactions with its world, but for whom the body was 
nothing but a means to implement solutions arrived at by pure 
reason. Imagine also that this being can control the body only by 
issuing a complex series of micro-managing commands to every tiny 
muscle, tendon, spring and actuator. A close real-world 
approximation to such a being is the early mobile robot, such as 
Shakey, built over three decades ago at the Stanford Research 
Institute. A ‘modestly embodied’ creature or robot would then be one 
for whom the body was not just another problem-space, requiring 
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constant micro-managed control, but was rather a resource whose 
own features and dynamics (of sensor placement, of linked tendons 
and muscle groups etc) could be actively exploited allowing for 
increasingly fluent forms of action selection and control. Much work in 
contemporary robotics explores this middle ground of modest 
embodiment, for example, Barbara Webb’s (1996) lovely work on the 
robot cricket in which sensor placement and time delays caused by 
signal transmission along internal pathways prove integral to its 
capacity to identify the song of a mate and locomote in that direction. 
What makes this an example of only modest embodiment is that the 
specific solution is ‘locked in’ by the details of the hard-wired 
architecture itself. Such systems are congenitally unable to learn new 
kinds of body-exploiting solution ‘on the fly’, in response to damage, 
growth, or change. 
 
It is perhaps hardly surprising that much (though not all- see 
Lungarella et al (2003)) work in real-world robotics explores this 
space of ‘modest embodiment’: after all, robots (so far) don’t grow, or 
use tools, or self-repair. By contrast, as we have seen, biological 
systems (and especially us primates) seem to be specifically 
designed so as to constantly search for opportunities to make the 
most of body and world, checking for what is available, and then (at 
various time-scales and with varying degrees of difficulty) integrating 
new resources very deeply, creating whole new agent-world circuits 
in the process. A ‘profoundly embodied’ creature or robot is thus 
(according to this definition) one that is highly engineered so as to be 
able to learn to make maximal problem-simplifying use of an open-
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ended variety of internal, bodily, or external sources of order. We 
saw, in previous sections, some hints of the kinds of engineering 
involved. It includes the use of plastic neural resources to create and 
update a body-schema, the capacity to factor the availability of 
information (wherever and however stored) into the heart of 
temporally fine-tuned problem-solving routines, and the capacity (in 
conscious beings like ourselves) for equipment to become 
transparent in use. This is not, of course, an all-or-nothing divide. 
Profound embodiment comes in many degrees and flavors, all the 
way from almost (but not quite) fully hard-wired solutions to 
amazingly plastic and re-configurable ones. But primates, as we have 
seen, seem to fall quite close to the more radically re-configurable 
end of this spectrum. 
 
But why describe this as ‘profound embodiment’ rather than as a 
return to the outdated (or so many of us believe- see Clark (1997)) 
image of mind as a disembodied organ of control? The answer is that 
these kinds of minds are not in the least disembodied. Rather, they 
are promiscuously body-and-world exploiting. They are forever 
testing and exploring the possibilities for incorporating  new resources 
and structures deep into their problem-solving regimes. They are, to 
use the jargon of Clark (2003), the minds of Natural-Born Cyborgs: of 
systems continuously re-negotiating their own limits, components, 
data-stores and interfaces. On this account, the body (any given 
biological or bio-technological body) is both critically important and  
constantly negotiable. It is critically important as it is a key player on 
the problem-solving stage. It is not simply the point at which 
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processes of transduction pass the real problems (now rendered in 
rich internal representational formats) to an inner engine of 
disembodied reason. Instead, much of our skilled engagement with 
the world flows, we saw, from the way subtle neural changes enable 
the embodied agent to rather directly engage the world, without 
representing every detail of bodily form and action-taking capacity (a 
neat example was the way tool-use affects receptive field properties 
that then implicitly distinguish ‘near’ space and ‘far’ space). But by the 
same token, all this is now highly negotiable, with the body-schema 
and other supporting resources apparently able to re-form and re-
configure as components, interfaces and resources change and shift. 
 
All this matters, both scientifically and philosophically. It matters 
scientifically since it puts plasticity and adaptability where they 
belong, at center stage of our best models of minds, agents and 
persons. And it matters philosophically since it invites us to take our 
best present and future technologies very seriously, as quite literally 
helping to constitute who and what we are. With this picture in mind, 
those opening fears expressed by Bruce Sterling should seem 
infinitely less compelling. Sterling paints a truly frightening picture of 
an augmented agent within whom “the CPU is a human being: old, 
weak, vulnerable, pitifully limited, possibly senile”. Such fears, I hope 
to have suggested, play upon a deeply misguided image of who and 
what we already are. They play upon an image of the human agent 
as doubly locked-in: as a fixed mind constituted solely by a given 
biological brain, and as a fixed bodily presence in a wider world. But 
human minds are not old-fashioned CPU’s trapped in fixed and 
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increasingly feeble corporeal shells. Instead, they are the surprisingly 
plastic minds of profoundly embodied agents: agents whose 
boundaries and components are forever negotiable, and for whom 
body, thinking and sensing are woven flexibly (and repeatedly) from 
the whole cloth of situated, intentional action. 
 
6. Enhancement or Subjugation? 
 
The picture I have painted is meant to be a guardedly optimistic one. 
It is our basic, biologically-grounded nature (or so I have suggested) 
to be open to a wide variety of forms of technologically-mediated 
enhancement, from sensory substitution to bodily extension to mental 
extension and cognitive reconfiguration. If this picture is correct, our 
best tools and technologies literally become us: the human self 
emerges as a 'soft self' (Clark (2003)), a constantly negotiable 
collection of resources easily able to straddle and criss-cross the 
boundaries between biology and artifact. In this hybrid vision of our 
own humanity I see potentials for repair, empowerment, and growth. 
But the very same hybrid vision may raise specters of coercion, 
monstering and subjugation. For clearly, not all change is for the 
better, and hybridization (however naturally it may come to us) is 
neutral rather than an intrinsic good. Uncritical talk of human 
'enhancement' thus threatens to beg philosophically, culturally and 
politically important questions. How do we distinguish genuine 
enhancement from pernicious encroachment and new horizons from 
new impositions? Such questions demand sustained, informed 
debate going far beyond the scope of the present treatment. But 
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there is cause for cautious optimism, and for three interlocking 
reasons. 
 
First, there is simply nothing new about human enhancement. Ever 
since the dawn of language and self-conscious thought, the human 
species has been engaged in a unique 'natural experiment' in 
progressive niche construction (see Sterelny (2004)). We engineer 
our own learning environments so as to create artificial 
developmental cocoons that impact our acquired capacities of 
thought and reason. Those enhanced minds then design new 
cognitive niches that train new generations of minds, and so on, in an 
empowering spiral of co-evolving complexity. The result is that, as 
Herbert Simon is reputed to have said, 'most human intelligence is 
artificial intelligence anyway'.  Technologies of human cognitive 
enhancement are just one more step along this ancient path. 
 
Second, the conscious mind is perfectly at ease with reliance upon 
anything that works! The biological brain is itself populated by a vast 
number of 'zombie processes' that underpin the skills and capacities 
upon which successful behavior depends. There are, for example, a 
plethora of such unconscious processes involved in activities from 
grasping an object (see Milner and Goodale (1995)) all the way to the 
flashes of insight that characterize much daily skilful problem-solving. 
Technology-based enhancements add, to that standard mix, still 
more processes whose basic operating principles are not available 
for conscious inspection and control. The patient using a brain-
computer interface to control a wheelchair will not typically know just 
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how it all works, or be able to reconfigure the interface or software at 
will. But in this respect too, the new equipment is simply on a par with 
much of the old. To fear that this must inevitably lead to dilutions of 
self-control and diminishment of responsibility is to miss the fact that 
we are already host to scores of similarly hidden processes. Insofar 
as this is compatible (in the biological case) with a sufficiently robust 
notion of self-control and of responsibility, it must at least be possible 
for the same to be true in the case of well-tuned technologically 
mediated enhancements. 
 
A third reason for cautious optimism is the power of the hybrid/cyborg 
image itself as a means of generating public debate. For once we 
accept that our best tools and technologies literally become us, 
changing who and what we are, we must surely become increasingly 
diligent and exigent, demanding technological prostheses better able 
to serve and promote human flourishing. Empirical science is now 
beginning (e.g. Layard (2005)) systematically to address the sources 
and wellsprings of human happiness and human flourishing, and the 
findings of these studies must themselves be taken as important data 
points for the design and marketing of putative technologies of 
enhancement. Just as the slogan that 'you are what you eat' 
contributed to the emerging recognition that food, far from simply 
being fuel, had a finely nuanced impact on our mental and physical 
health, so the realization that we are soft selves, wide open to new 
forms of hybrid cognitive and physical being, should serve to remind 
us to choose our bio-technological unions very carefully, for in so 





I have tried to show that we humans are profoundly embodied 
agents: creatures for whom body, sensing, world and technology are  
resources apt for recruitment in ways that yield a permeable and 
repeatedly reconfigurable agent/world boundary. For the profoundly 
embodied agent, the world is not something locked away behind the 
fixed veil of a certain skin-bag, a reasoning engine and a primary 
sensory sheath. Rather, it is a resource apt for active recruitment and 
use, in ways that bring new forms of embodied intelligence into being. 
Such agents are genuinely of their worlds, and not simply in them. 
They are not helpless bystanders watching the passing show from 
behind a fixed veil of sensing, acting and representing, but the active 
architects of their own bounds and capacitiesxii. Such a perspective 
invites a cautious optimism concerning converging technologies for 
improving human performance. This discussion has emphasized the 
potential for new forms of human-machine (or brain-machine) 
interface. But such technologies may also be chemical, 
computational, genetic, bio-mechanical or nano-technological. They 
may augment and alter mind, sensing, and body. But whatever the 
form, the key to successful integration and assimilation looks to be 
the same: the creation of new forms of rich, feedback-driven agent-
world circuit, with sensing and acting under active intentional control.  
 
Recognition of our vast potential for bio-technological mergers and 
coalitions should, I finally argued, be a source not of fear and loathing 
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but of guarded hope and cautious optimism. It should increase our 
respect for the deep biological plasticity that makes such mergers 
possible, reduce our fears of an unnatural 'post-human' future, and 
license greater expectations concerning the answerability of our 
chosen tools and technologies to our best empirical models of the 
wellsprings of human happiness and human flourishing. 
 
 
Department of Philosophy 





*This paper is respectfully dedicated to the memory of Francisco 
Varela. Thanks to all the participants at the Tribute to Francisco 

















                                                 
i This is by no means an isolated case. Susan Hurley (1998) argues convincingly 
that perception typically involves whole cycles of input-output behavior in 
which sensing and acting dynamically combine to yield ongoing adaptive fit 
between whole organisms and the world. This perspective also fits well with 
recent work in so-called interactive vision (see (Ballard 1991) (1991), Ballard et al 
(1997)).  The theme of active engagement is similarly visible in a variety of recent 
treatments that stress the importance of motor activity to perception (see e.g. 
O’Regan and Noe (2001) , Churchland et al (1994), Clark (1999), Noe (2004). 
 
ii In fact, it is rather doubtful that these kinds of Gibsonian invariant detection 
involve truly high-bandwith coupling at all. But (given the extreme difficulty of 
 33 
                                                                                                                                                 
finding a non-controversial measure of objective bandwidth) I am willing to 
grant this for the sake of argument. My point will be that such high-bandwidth 
coupling, even if present, does not undermine the idea of interfaces located at 
just those points. 
 
iii A typical description reads: “Computational Grids enable the sharing, 
selection, and aggregation of a wide variety of geographically distributed 
computational resources (such as supercomputers, compute clusters, storage 
systems, data sources, instruments, people) and presents them as a single, 
unified resource for solving large-scale compute and data intensive computing 
applications” (Quote taken from the GRID computing information center at: 
http://www.gridcomputing.com/). 
 
iv See Mussa-Ivaldi and Miller (2003), Bach-y-Rita and Kercel (2003), Clark (2003) 
 
v See http://www.stelarc.va.com.au, and full discussion in Clark (2003) chapter 5 
 
vi Gallagher (1998) expresses the difference like this: 
“Body schema can be defined as a system of preconscious, subpersonal processes 
that play a dynamic role in governing posture and movement… There is an 
important and often overlooked conceptual difference between the subpersonal 
body schema and what is usually called body image. The latter is most often 




 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing this issue 
 
viii But see Simons et al (2002) for some important provisos.  
 
ix For some more detailed explorations of this idea, see O’Regan and Noe (2001) 
and Clark (2002) 
 
x For a lovely example of this, see Gray and Fu (2004).  
 
xi See, among many others, Varela et al (1991), Clark (1997), O’Regan and Noe 
(2001) 
 
xii For some important explorations of these themes, see Heidegger (1927), 
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